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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Insurance: Indemnity for unlawful acts: Theory of protecting injured
third parties.-In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones et al., 45 F. Supp.
887 (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1942), the policy insured Jones againt "bodily injuries or death suffered or alleged to have been suffered, as the result of any
accident occurring while this Policy is in force, by any person or persons not
employed by the Assured, by reason of the classified operations of the Assured's trade or business." Oscar Martin, "not employed by the Assured,"
was shot and injured by Jones himself as a result of a quarrel in the sale
of oil by Jones, operator of a gasoline filling station. Selling oil was part of
Jones' business. Held, this is an "accident" within the meaning of the policy
and Martin is entitled to garnish the insurer for payment of a judgment
obtained by Martin against Jones.
The reasoning'proceeded thus: The Michigan courts uniformly permit an
insured who suffers injury at the hands of another, whether intentional or
not, to recover from his "own" insurance company on an accident policythe theory being that so far as he is concerned the injury was an accident.
This court, sitting in 'diversity, is bound by the Michigan decisions.1 In
Michigan liability insurance is for the protection of third parties. 2 This policy
of insurance ipsured customers against accidents. Martin was a "customer."
He seemingly did nothing to provoke or encourage Jones. He therefore suffered an "accident"-so far as he was concerned. He may recover from
his "own" insurance company; he may also recover from Jones' insurance
company.
The problem here springs from a conflict of interests in the field of insurance. Public policy early led the courts deciding property insurance problems to refuse to permit the insured to profit from his own wrongful act
or to insure himself against liability for the consequences of his own wrongs
when they were wilful in character. This rule of thumb worked well where
the insured's interests alone were at stake, but where in liability coverages
the interests of a third party entered, the court faced a new problem. Should
it hold rigidly to the old rule of thumb and deny or grant recovery solely
on the basis of the nature of the insured's'act? Or should it protect the injured third party from financially irresponsible wrongdoers even when acting not merely negligently but wilfully. The trend has been toward the latter
view. But such interpretations as in the principal case are arrived at only
after many years of litigation, and it is to be noted that legislation is the
basis of the present decision.
The initial opposition to liability insurance formed its roots in the contention that indemnifying the assured against even his own negligence would
result in a relaxation of his vigilance toward the rights of others. Concern
for the victim of the negligence overrode these considerations. The attitude
'Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
2
MICH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1937) tit. 24, § 296.
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of the courts toward this 4rgument is shown in the case of Merchants Mutual

Automobile Liability Irsurance Co. v. Snart,3 wherein the court said :4

"Having in mind the sense of immunity of the owner protected by the
insurance and the possible danger of a less degree of care due to that
immunity, it would seem to be a reasonable provision by the State in the
interest of the public, whose lives and limbs are exposed, to require that
the owner in the contract indemnifying him against any recovery from
him should stipulate with the insurance company that the indemnity by
which he saves himself should certainly inure to the benefit of the person who thereafter is injured."
Such negligence is dearly a violation of the general rule of conduct toward
others, but the courts found little objection to insurance against its consequences.
In the field of automobile operation, where liability insurance has had its
greatest development, the courts soon passed beyond the stage of allowing
coverage for the mere general negligence of the insured tortfeasor. They held
that not even the violation of statutes by the insured driver would void the
policy. In Pawlicki v. Hollenbeck,5 the court said, "It may wqll be doubtful
whether an instance of negligent injury can be imagined in the operation of
a motor vehicle on a highway which does not involve a violation of law.".
Another court then held that a policy which was broad enough to cover a
loss sustained by the assured from an accident arising because of a violation of a speed ordinance by one of its automobile drivers was not void as
against public policy.6 In this case, the taxicab company was suing the insurance company upon its bond of indemnity. One of the, defenses set up by
the insurance company was that the insured's driver was exceeding the lty
speed limit when the accident occurred. The court said :7
"As written, the contract is broad enough to cover a loss sustained
by the assured from an accident arising because of a violation of a speed
ordinance by one of its drivers. The only question that is open to the
appellant, therefore, is whether such a contract is void as against public
policy. Answering this question, we are clear that the contract is not
so void."
So far we have not dealt with an insured's wilfulness in bringing about
the injury to the particular victim. Whether or ndt the insured in such a
case could still claim the protection of his, policy was an inevitable question.
But it was approached in a line of cases where negligence assumed such
proportions that death resulted to the victim, and the tortfeasor thus became
subject not merely to a civil action for damages which he called on his insurer
3267 U. S. 126, 45 Sup. Ct. 320 (1925).
4Id. at 129, 45 Sup. Ct. at 321.
5250
Mich. 38, 44, 229 N. W. 626, 628 (1930).
6
Taxicab Motor Co. v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co., 73 Wash. 631, 132 Pac. 393 (1913).
Id. at 638-639, 132 Pac. at 396.
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to defend, but to a criminal prosecution for homicide as well. The victim's
case was as good as ever, but the insured was now asking protection from
the civil results of his own criminal act. Here public policy was at once
called upon both to deny, and also to validate, the insurance company's liability
to pay. Although the validity of the insurance would permit the insured to
profit by his own wrong, the policy was now nevertheless hailed as the protector of third persons. Thus one writer says :8
"The fundamental question, from a social point of view, is not whether
a policy to indemnify against a liability for killing is valid, but rather
whether any judicial construction of such policy which does not give primarily the benefits of it to the injured person is defensible. Generally,
the validity of the policy is conceded."
9
The cases in general bear this out. In Jones v. British Gen. Ins. Co. re-

covery from the insurance company was permitted although the insured
defendant was found guilty of manslaughter for driving while intoxicated
and thereby causing the death of the judgment creditor. The Jones decision
is generally considered commendable because it protects the public from
injuries at the hands of financially irresponsible drivers.' °
It is true that such holdings as these were implemented by provisions that
the money which the insurer had to pay went to the victim of the accident.
Nevertheless, the court was yielding to a definite trend toward liability insurance as a device for providing funds for the injured party rather than
for the protection of the insured."
In the case under discussion the c6urt reached the ultimate question:
Whether the insured's policy would be enforced against the insurer when
the insured's act was one wilfully intended to injure the victim. If the
policy had specifically provided a gangster, say, with Such coverage, the court
would have had a sharper problem. Yet the result it reached in reading the
word "accidental" is the same. Other courts have refused to give the word
so wide a meaning and so avoided the ultimate question. Some courts hold
that the state of the will of the party inflicting the injury determines. Under
this test, where the insured threw a porcelain vessel at a boy trespasser, fracturing his skull, and judgment was recovered against her, the court in the
Sontag case refused to hold the insurer liable.1 2 It said that it is the state
of will of the person by whose act the ,injury was caused, rather than that
8

Laube, The Social Vice of Accident Indemnity (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 189, 193.
9137 L. T. R. 156 (K. B. 1927), noted with approval, (1927) 37 YALE L. 3. 265. Cf.
Tinline v. Whitecross Ins. Assn., Ltd., [1921] 3 K. B. 327 (recovery allowed where
insured's own gross negligence made him guilty of manslaughter) ; contra, O'Hearn v.
Yorkshire Ins. Co., 67 D. L. R. 735 (Ont. 1921).
10See Note (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 265.
" McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Liability Instrance (1941) 41 CoL. L. Rzv. 26, 60.
' 2 Sontag v. Galer, 279 Mass. 309, 181 N. E. 182 (1932). See also, Commonwealth
Casualty Co. v. Readers, 118 Ohio St. 429, 161 N. E. 278 (1928); Rothman et a[. v.
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 241, 16 N. E. (2d) 417, 117 A. L. R.
1169 (1938).
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of the injured person, which determines whether the injury was "accidental."
The court added that the insured would not claim indemnity for her own
wilful act.
On the other side is Robinson v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 1 3 Here,
as in the main case the plaintiff had a public liability policy insuring him
against damages resulting from "accidents." One of his salesmen wilfully
and wantonly assaulted one, Wells. The Mississippi court held that the
assault was "accidental" from Wells' standpoint and allowed recovery. It
could be said indeed that it was accidental from the insured employer's standpoint, and it is suggested that these cases may be reconciled by their difference in facts. The Massachusetts court meant that the insured could not
recover for her own, personally wilful act. The Massachusetts decision is
supported by an English decision, Haseldine v. Hoskin.14 In that case, the
wilful act was that of champerty. The English court held that this was not
"neglect, omission or error" within the meaning of the policy and added
that even if it were, it would be against public p9licy to allow insurance
against a champerton's act. Another means of reconciliation is through the
theory of protection followed by the courts. By holding that "accidental"
depends upon the state of will of the one inflicting the injury, and by
further denying recovery because it was the assured's own wilful act, the
Massachusetts court emphasized the theory ihat insurance is for the protection of the insured, not the injured person. On the other hand, the
Mississippi court is decidedly in favor of the injured third party rule. This
distinction is made even more clear by an examination of the principal
case and-the Sontag case, supra.
In the Sontag case, the policy protected against liability for injuries "accidentally sustained by any person not in the employ of the insured," a landlady. In the principal case, Jones was similarly insured against similar injuries sustained by reason of the classified operations of his business. In
both cases, a third party, other than an employee of the assured, is injured
by the wilful act of the assured. Yet, the results reached are directly opposite. Thus, the distinction that the act in the Robinson case was not the assured's own wilful act would seem to have been rejected in the principal
case. The Michigan court, in the principal case, on practically the same set
of facts as in the Sontag case, chooses to follow the Robinson case in construing "accidental" from the standpoint of the injured party. But it expressly states that the insured cannot recover for his own wilful act-the
true basis for the decision in the Sontag case. The court then adds-and this
is the solution to our problem-that under Michigan law, liability insurance
is for the protection of third parties. Carried to its ultimate this theory
would make no distinction between a homicide which was manslaughter 15
13159 Miss. 14, 131 So. 541 (1931).
14[1933) 1 K. B.822.
15James v. British Gen. Ins. Co., 137 L.T.R. 156 (K. B. 1927) ; Tinline, v. Whitecross
Ins. Ass'n., Ltd., (19211 3 K. B. 327. See Note (1927) 37 YALE L. J.265.
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and one which was murder. Courts have, however, hesitated on the point., 6
. For the insurer the way out might be to expressly except liability for the
wilful or intentional wrongful acts of the insured who pays the minimum
premium, and charge accordingly for the extended protection. The Michigan
court in the principal case suggests that such a provision would probably
be upheld. In Wheeler v. O'Connell et al.,' 7 however, the court expressly
said that, had the policy contained an exception against liability for injuries
caused by the wilful conduct of the operator, such a policy would be in violation of the Massachusetts law as containing an exception or exclusion "as to
specified accidents or injuries or causes thereof." Public policy, when it
carries the argument in both directions, is a difficult steed to ride. The insurer is likely to be subject to the vagaries of the court.
George E. Schatt
International Law: Sovereign Immunity: Comity: Right of nation at
war with United States to claim immunity for property in this country.-In Telkes v. Hungarian National Museum, 265 App. Div. 192, 38
N. Y. S. (2d) 419 (2d Dep't 1942) suit was begun by service of a summons
by publication after issuance of and levy under a warrant of attachment.
Plaintiff alleges three causes of action stemming from a contract of employMient as director of the Hungarian Reference Library. The Royal Consul
General of Sweden appeared specially and moved to vacate the levy under,
the attachment. The defendant appeals from an order denying the motion
of the Royal Consul,' who had been designated by the Swedish Minister to
the United States to bring this proceeding. The Department of State had
recognized the authority of the Swedish Minister to act as a representative
of Hungarian interests in the United States, because of the existence of
a state of war between the United States and Hungary. The State Department made no suggestion to the court concerning the claim of immunity
involved herein.
6
1n the principal case, at page 890, the court said "...
we are convinced that if
Jones had gotten into his automobile and intentionally run over Martin, we doubt whether
any insurance company would have questioned its liability."
But in Tinline v. Whitecross Ins. Ass'n, Ltd., [1921] 3 K. B. 327, 328, the court said,
"I want it to be clearly understood that if this accident had been due to an intentional
act on the part of the plaintiff, this policy could "not possibly protect him, but then if a
man driving a motor car at excessive speed intentionally runs into a man and kills him,
the result is not manslaughter but murder, the reason being that manslaughter is the
result of an accident and murder is not, and it is against accident only that this policy

insures."

Yet, in Wheeler v. O'Connell, et. al., 297 Mass. 549, 551, 9 N. E. (2d) 544, 546, the
court said, ". . . if the purpose of the statute is to compensate the injured party rather
than to save the operator of the vehicle from loss, it is difficult to see why an injured
person's rights should be affected by the fact that the operator's conduct was wilful,'
wanton or reckless as distinguished from negligent."
2729Z Mass. 549, 553, 9 N. E. (2d) 544, 547 (1937).
1178 Misc. 587, 34 N. Y. S. (2d) 565 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1942).
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The Appellate Division of the First Department, Justice Callahan writing
the opinion, held:
"We conclude that, in such an action, brought in persoam or quasi in
rem, a sovereign may not be sued in our courts, or have his property
attached here. Existence of a state of war would not seem to alter
this rule."2
Aside from the question of the effect of war, it is well recognized as a
basic principle of general application in the courts of this country that both
our own government, and the governments of friendly foreign nations are
immune from suit. The immunity of the domestic sovereign is based upon
the historic, principle that no power can command the King, and it may
rest upon constitutional provisions which confer or deny the right to sue.
The immunity of the foreign sovereign rests upon a somewhat different
theory. It is founded upon the implied consent on the part of all sovereigns,
as a matter of comity, to a relaxation of the complete jurisdiction which
each naturally enjoys within his own territory.3 Theoretically, therefore,
the immunity of the domestic sovereign is a matter of right, while that of
the foreign government is a matter of favor, granted voluntarily by the
domestic government. 4 The immunity is not merely personal; the property
of the sovereign is also immune. 5 Actually there has been considerable
statutory waiver of immunity by the United States 6 but the immunity of
the foreign sovereign, if properly claimed, 7 is unimpaired by any statutory
refusals on our part to grant it. No objection to the method of claiming
the immunity was raised in the case here discussed.
A state may have two kinds of sovereignty-internal and external. Internal sovereignty is that which she enjoys when dealing with matters in
which her own territory and her own subjects are involved. 8 External
2265 App. Div. at 197, 38 N. Y. S. (2d) at 424. Since, however, there was a sharply
contested question of fact as to whether the defendant was an instrumentality of the
Kingdom of Hupgary or an autonomous foreign corporation organized under the laws
of 3Hungary, the court directed a reference.
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 3 L. ed. 287 (1812) ; Berizzi
Bros. v. The Pesaro, 271 U. S. 562, 46 Sup. Ct. 611 (1926); Compania Espanola v.

The
4 Navemar, 303 U. S. 6, 58 Sup. Ct. 432 (1938).
The Santissima Trinidad & The St. Andre, 7 Wheat. 283, 5 L. ed. 454 (1822) ; see
Hayes, Private Claims Against Foreign Sovereigns (1925) 38 HARV. L. REv. 599; also

Deak, The Plea of Sovereign Immunity and the New York Court of Appeals (1940)
405COL. L. REv . 453, 455; also, 15 R. C. L. § 51.
Weston, Actions Against the Property of Sovereigns (1919) 32 HAv. L. REv. 366.

GPublic Vessels Act of March 3, 1925, c. 428, 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U. S. C.
§§ 781 et seq. (1940). See also Act of March 9, 1920, c. 95, 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46
U. S. C. §§,741 et seq. (1940).

see

For an analysis of both statutes and their application,

(1939) §§ 33, 34. The latter statute is noted in (1930) 39
YALE L. J.' 1189, "Responsibility of the United States on Maritime Claims Arising Out
of 7 the Operation of Government Owned Vessels."
RoB rsoN, ADmixAx.rTy (1939) § 32.
81 OPPENHEIM, INTmrNATioNAL LAW (5th ed. 1937) § 124. According to the rule,
RoBINs61N, ADmIIrvT

quidquid est in territorio est etiam de territorio, all individuals and poverty within the
territory of a state are under its dominion and sway, and even foreign individuals and
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sovereignty is that which she enjoys as a member of the family of nations,
not as a matter of right, but as a matter of comity.9 When a court declines
to' inquire into the validity of sovereign political acts within the territory
of a foreign sovereign, this is not a denial of jurisdiction over the person or
a grant of immunity on the grounds of comity., It is an assertion that no
jural basis exists for the action. It rests upon the concept that law requires
the sanction of a sovereign, and that such sanction is lacking against the
supreme political power. Thus we frequently find confusion, the defense
of sovereign immunity being offered when actually the proper defense is
that the acts complained of do not constitute an actionable wrong.
In the Telkes case here noted, the court found "no controlling authority"
on the precise question before it. It purported, however, to find an "analogous question" in the long series of cases in which the New York courts
had dealt with the status of the Soviet Russian government while the latter
actually controlled Russia in fact, while the United States recognized only
the "Kerensky Government" which the Soviet had ousted.10 In Wulfsohn
v. Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic,'1 discussed by Justice Callahan
in his opinion, the Court of Appeals vacated an attachment of property within
New York, although the defendant claiming sovereign immunity was not
recognized by the United States. 12

In Nankivel v. Omsk-All Russian Gov-

ernme.nt,'3 likewise discussed in the opinion, the Court of Appeals held the
unrecognized Omsk Government immune from suit for the recovery of the
value of.certain automobiles requisitioned by it, on the 'score of its sovereign
character. Similarly in The Denny,'4 the court granted immunity to the
then unrecognized Lithuanian government, stressing the fact that all the
property fall under the territorial supremacy of a state when they' cross its borders.
See also Hayes, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 600: "The principle of not inquiring into the
acts within the territorial jurisdiction of a sovereign would not prevent suit where the
acts complained of occurred upon the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a different
sovereign." See HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922) §§ 54, 55; see also Kawanokoka
v. Polybank, 205 U. S. 349, 27 Sup. Ct. 526 (1907) (held, the Territory of Hawaii was
entitled to sovereign immunity, "not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but upon the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against
the authority that makes the law upon which the right depends").
9
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 3 L. ed. 287 (1812).
'OSee Borchard, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts (1932) 26 AM,.
J. INT. L. 261; Moore, Fifty Years of International Law (1937) 50 HARV. L. REV. 395,
434 et seq. The bibliography of the topic is large.
"1234
N. Y. 372, 138 N. E. 24 (1923).
' 21d. at 374, 138 N. E. at 25: "The litigation is not, therefore, with regard to title to
property situated within the jurisdiction of our courts where the result depends on the
effect to be given to the action of ;ome foreign government. Under such circumstances
it might be that the theory of the comity of nations-would have a place ....
Whenever
an act done by a sovereign in his sovereign character is questioned, it becomes a matter
of negotiation or of war." In the Wulfsohn case, the property was furs in Russia which
were confiscated by the defendant government.
3237 N. Y. 150, 142 N. E. 569 (1923).
14127 F. (2d) 404 (D. C. N. J. 1941). The court leaves undecided the effect of the
decrees of an unrecognized state if in suit with an American the plea of sovereign
immunity were raised.
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litigants were Lithuanians, and .that the immunity granted was that accorded
any government when sued by a citizen of the same government without
its consent. These cases would seem-to justify drawing the conclusion that
the internal sovereignty of a state does not require the recognition by
other states to confirm its internal sovereignty. In this respect, the de facto
existence of the state is sufficient to establish its internal sovereignty de jure.'5
A fortiori, the acts of a recognized sovereign in exercise of its internal sovereignty will not be a proper subject for inquiry in the courts of a sister state.
If the sovereign is in fact recognized in the forum, it may even have no
de facto control of its own territory and its acts still be recognized, as are
the various governnients-in-exile now existing. 16 In the recent case, Anderson v. Transandine Handelnmatschappij,'7 the New York Court of Appeals
held that the decree of a recognized foreign government in exile (Netherlands) would be given effect if it did not offend the public policy of this
state. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States,'8 it was held that the statute
of limitations ran against the recognized Russian government in exile since
recognition was sufficient to permit it to bring suit as a foreign sovereign.
Other cases granting immunity to the recognized foreign sovereign hold that
the grant is conditional upon there being no breach of municipal law,x9
20
upon there being no revocation of the implied license by the local sovereign,
and upon there being no violation of the law of nations
or of those of the
2
country where the act of sovereignty was performed. 1
Yet, although the unrecognized state could be given immunity if sued,
under New York decisions it could not itself sue. Writers have agreed that
22
through recognition alone could a state become an "international person,"
and in Rusian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario,2- the New
York Court of Appeals held that the unrecognized foreign sovereign plain151 WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 1929) 43.
IGSee Landheer, The Legal Status of the Netherlands (1943) 41 MIcH. L. Rlv. 644.

17289 N. Y. 9, 43 N. E. (2d) 502 (1942). "By comity of nations, rights based upon
the law of a foreign state to intangible property, which has a situs in this state, are
recognized and enforced by the courts of this state, unless such enforcement would
offend the public policy of this state." See also United States v. Belmont, 85 F. (2d)
542 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
18304 U. S.126, 58 Sup. Ct. 785 (1938).
19Ervin v. Quintanilla, 99 F. (2d) 935 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), cert. den., 306 U. S. 635,
59 20Sup. Ct. 485 (1939).
The Santissima Trinidad & The St. Andre, 7 Wheat. 283, 5 L.ed. 454 (1822) ; The
Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch. 116, 3 L. ed. 287 (1812).
21
Fields v. Predionica i. Tkanica, 265 App. Div. 132, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 874 (1st Dep't

1942).

221 OPPENHEIMT, INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1928) 145: "...
in particular, it
acquires (through recognition) immunity of jurisdiction, except by its consent, in the
courts of those states." WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAw (6th ed. 1929) 45: "The external sovereignty of any state, on the other hand, may require recognition by other
states in order to render it perfect and complete . . . and until such recognition becomes
universal on the part of the other states, the new state becomes entitled to the exercise
of its external sovereignty as to those states only by whom that sovereignty has been
recognized."
23235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923).
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tiff could not maintain suit, saying: "We permit it (the recognized foreign
sovereign) to appear and protect those interests as a body analogous to
one possessing corporate rights, but solely because of comity. Comity may
be defined as that reciprocal courtesy which one member of the family of
s4
nations owes to the others. It presupposes friendship. In the Luther v. Sagor
Scrutton, L. J., in granting immunity to the recently recognized Soviet
government, described it thus: "This immunity follows from recognition as
a sovereign state. Should there be any government which appropriates
other persons' property without -compensation,' the remedy appears to be
to.refuse to recognize it as a sovereign state. Then the courts could investigate the title without infringing the comity of nations." Other English cases
25
In the
say that in the absence of recognition, there will be no immunity.
federal courts of the United States, the effects of non-recognition
upon external sovereignty have included denial of the authority of an
ambassador of an unrecognized sovereign to continue a suit commenced
when the foreign sovereign was recognized, 26 a running of the statute of
limitations .against an unrecognized sovereign who could not sue during that
period, 27 and a denial of immtmity to a sovereign with whom diplomatic
relations were suspended. 28 The conclusion would seem to follow that the
existence of a foreign sovereign will not alone be sufficient to establish its
external sovereignty. Recognition, friendship, and conformity with municipal law would seem to be prerequisites to an exercise of external sovereignty.
Thus, as to the unrecognized sovereign government, we have considerable
case law under which the unrecognized government, if it could not sue of
its own motion, was not barred from appearing to defend itself and its
property and from claiming immunity.
It was against this background that the court laid its present problem.
Is there sufficient analogy between the status of the unrecognized foreign
To this and
government and that of a belligerent foreign government?
'29
without any special argument, the court answered "Yes."
The only questions left were the questions of fact as to the connection of
the Library with the Hungarian Government and the international status
of the latter. Whether the entity involved is or is not a foreign sovereign,
24[1921] 3 K. B. 532.
25
Fenton Textile Assn. v. Krassin, 38 T. L. R. 259, 261 (C. A. 1921); The Annette
P. 105.
[1919]
26
Government of France v. Isbrandtaen-Moller Co., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 631, (S. D.
N. Y. 1943).
27Unjon of Soviet Socialist Republics v. National City Bank of N. Y., 41 F. Supp.
3532 (S.D. N. Y. 1941).
SThe Gul Diemal, 296 Fed. 567 (S. D. N. Y. 1922), aff'd on other grounds, 264 U. S.
90,2944 Sup. Ct 244 (1924).
"From these cases it would appear that as viewed by the courts of this state, the
rule forbidding suit against a foreign sovereign without his consent does not rest on
comity, but is applied because such suits involve claims of a political nature which are
not entrusted to the municipal courts. Based on the reasoning that immunity from
suit is not a matter of comity, our courts hold that a lack of diplomatic recognition
does not affect the immunity. We see no difference in principle between a case where
recognition is lacking and a case where we are at war with a sovereign."
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the courts of both the United States 0 and England'

take judicial notice,

and in case of doubt or uncertainty inform themselves through the executive.
Indeed, since the step is one involving possibly serious political consequences,
the courts will welcome and not infrequently solicit an expression from the
32
political department, concerning the claim.
In the instant case, there has been no suggestion by the State JDepartment concerning the claim of immunity. In the Pesaro, Judge Mack regarded the failure of the State Department to act "not without significance";
however, he added that he did not mean to imply that, immunity should
be refused in a clear case simply because the executive failed to act. 33 . Indeed,
since Lanwnt v. The Travelers' Ins. Co.,t' the weight to be given a sugges30
1n Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 309 (1918), the court
took judicial notice that our government recognized the government of Carranza. In
Russian Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923), it was held that
an allegation in a complaint that the plaintiff is a sovereign state is not conclusive,
"where the truth is otherwise, as proved by public matters of which the court is bound
to take judicial, notice." In Puente v. Spanish National State, 116 F. (2d) 42 (G. C.
A. 2d, 1940), the court took judicial notice that the defendant was a sovereign.
31
1n the English courts the principle has been more clearly enunciated. In Yrisarir
v. Clemnent, 2 Car. & P. 223 (1825), at 225, it was held that, "if a foreign state is recognized in this country, it is not necessary to prove it is an existing state." In Taylor
v. Barclay, 2 Sim. 213 (1828), where the allegation was that the foreign government
was recognized, the court, in holding such allegation incorrect, said: ". . . it is the
duty of the Judge in every Court to take notice of public matters which affect the
Government of the Country. . .

."

Cf. Mighell v. Sultan of Johore [1894] 1 Q. B. 149;

Duff
Development Co. Ltd. v. Gov't of Kelantan [1924] A. C. 797, 805, 823.
32 The New York cases: Hassard v. Mexico, 29 Misc. 511, 61 N. Y. Supp. 939 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 1899), aff'd w. op., 173 N. Y. 645, 66 N. E. 1110 (1903); DeSimone v.
Transportes Maritinios do Estado, 199 App. Div. 602, 191 N. Y. Supp. 864 (1st Dep't
1922) ; Galopin v. Winsor, 234 App. Div. 601, 251 N. Y. Supp. 448 (1st Dep't 1931);
Ezra v. Lamont, 265 N. Y. 634, 193 N. E. 421 (1934), cert. den., 295 U. S. 766, 55
Sup. Ct. 923 (1935); Hannes v. Roumania Monopolies Inst. 260 App. Div. 189, 20
N. Y. S. (2d) 825 (1st Dep't 1940); Lamont v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 281 N. Y. 362,
24 N. E. (2d) 81 (1939); Anderson v. Handelmaatschappij et al., 289 N. Y. 9, 43
N. E. (2d) 502 (1941).)
The federal cases: The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); EX parte Muir,
254 U. S. 522, 41 Sup. Ct. 185 (1921); Oliver American Trading Co. v. Gov't of
Mexico, 264 U. S. 440, 44 Sup. Ct 390 (1924) ; Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunlig
jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930), cert. den., 282 U. S. 896, 51
Sup. Ct. 181 (1931) ; The Navemar, 303 U. S. 68, 58 Sup. Ct. 432 (1938), enlighteningly
analyzed by Hyde, Concerning the Navemar (1939) 33 Am. J. INT. L. 531.
See also Deak, Plea of Sovereign Immunity and the New York Court of Appeals
(1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 453; Feller, Procedurein Cases Involving Immunities of Foreign
States i Courts of the United States (1931) 25 Ams. 3. INT. L. 83; Sack, Ininunity
of Instrumentalities of Foreign States (1931) 26 ILL. L. REV. 215; Note (1940) 50
YA. L. J. 1088.
33277 Fed. 473, 479 ((S. D. N. Y. 1921).
34281 N. Y. 362, 24 N. E. (2d) 81 (1939). The court said: "...
The mere assertion by a foreign government, without proof that property which is the subject of controversy between parties here belongs to the government does not constrain the court
fo refuse jurisdiction of that property." This was the holding, although the district
attorney appeared specially to present the suggestion at the request of the Secretary
of State, following diplomatic representations. This procedure was approved in The
Navemar, 303 U. S. 68, 58 Sup. Ct. 432 (1938).
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tion by the Executive Department is uncertain-the presence of the suggestion is not conclusive of the merits of the claim. The absence or the
presence of a suggestion, therefore, warrants neither a denial, nor a grant
of the immunity, but merely an investigation. In the main case, the court
would seem to have been correct in attaching nb commanding significance to
the absence of the suggestion.
In similar cases, courts have entertained the companion problem of whether
the person asserting the claim to sovereign immunity is one authorized
to do so. Inasmuch as a suggestion by the State Department embodies an
implication, if not a tatement, that the person asserting the claim is a duly
authorized representative, the question of the capacity of the claimant is most
frequently presented for the court's determination when a suggestion is
lacking. In the Anne5 Justice Story held a Spanish consul incompetent to
assert a claim of sovereign immunity. In the Sao Vincee 6 a consul general
was held incompetent to appear and claim immunity. In the Gui DjentalI3 7
the Supreme Court held that a master of a ship could not claim immunity,
because he was not so authorized.-" And in the recent case of Ex Parte
Coionna8 9 the Supreme Court held that the Italian Ambassador could not
assert the Italian government's claimr to sovereign immunity where a vessel
of the Italian government (allegedly) was the subject of litigation. The
reason given by the court was: war suspends the right of the enemy plaintiff
to prosecute an action in our courts. The case is not directly determinative
of the immunity of the ship from attachment, inasmuch as it decides merely
the Ambassador's incapacity to assert the right.
In the principal case, the court has before it the Royal Consul General
of Sweden as claimant of the immunity. He was designated to bring this
proceeding by the Swedish Minister to the United States, who has been
recognized by the State Department as the representative of Hungarian
interests in the United States.40 Dicta in recent cases would tend to indicate
353 Wheat. 435, 445 (U. S. 1818); see also The Secundus, 13 F. (2d) 469 (E. D.
N. Y. 1926).
386260 U. S. 151, 43 Sup. Ct. 15 (1922).
37264
U. S. 90, 44,Sup. Ct. 244 (1924), aff'g 296 Fed. 567 (1922).
38
For a fuller discussion of the procedural aspects of the plea of sovereign immunity,
see articles cited supra note 32. In addition, see Note (1941)50 YALE L. J. 1088.
39314
U. S. 510, 62 Sup. Ct. 373 (1942).
40
It has been the practice in recent wars, for various belligerent governments, upon
the-rupture of diplomatic relations, to entrust the care of their interests in enemy
countries to the embassies of friendly neutral powers. See 1 GARNER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE WORLD WAR (1920) § 39, for examples. For an exposition of the status
of the neutral's representatives in reference to the belligerent's property, see Instructions
to Diplonatic and Conmular Officers of the United Stat s (so entrusted) (1915) 9 Am.
J. INT. L. (Supp.) 118; 4 HACKWORTE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1942) § 397.
Excerpts from the State Department Instructions: ". . . the arrangement contemplates the exercise of no official function on your part, but only the use of unofficial
good offices. You are not officers of the unrepresented government. . . . The State
of War existing between the country to which you are accredited and the country for
which you are acting is inconsistent with the continuance of diplomatic intercourse
between them. . . . Any interference on the part of private persons or officials with
such property. should be 'the subject of an.unofficial representation or protest to the
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that the Swedish Consul General was not, merely as consul general, a proper
claimant. 4 ' The court, however, has accepted him on the facts of the case.
It would seem further that it has judicially recognized the sovereign status
of the Kingdom of Hungary and has added to the procedures approved in
the Naventar4 2 the procedure in this case, namely, the special appearance
of a consul authorized by the minister of a government mutually friendly
to the two belligerents to assert an immunity which a similarly authorized
official of a belligerent government would be unable to assert. The reasoning which establishes the procedures in the Navemar would hardly seem to
support such an extension.
Whether the Kingdom of Hungary, thus judicially recognized as a soyereign, is actually exercising its external sovereignty, in the instant case,
gave rise to a hotly-contested question of fact for the determination of which
the court quite properly directed a reference. 43 Whether the defendant is
an* instrumentality of the Kingdom of Hungary or merely a Hungarian
corporation is determinative of the propriety of the claim of sovereign immunity. The decision of the court at this point seems to have been that if
the defendant were an autonomous corporation organized under the laws
of Hungary, the plea of sovereign immunity would not attach; while if the
defendant were proven to be a public instrumentality of the Kingdom of
Hungary, that the plea would be upheld."
*The court seems to indicate that the grant of immunity would follow
once the exercise of external sovereignty was established. But it does not
follow that the sovereign may claim immunity for all its external activities
regardless of their character. The trend of modem decisions has been away
from such an automatic settlement of the problems. They attempt to distingnish the "sovereign" activities of a state and the "non-sovereign" activities, "act of sovereignty" versus "act of management," sovereign acting ;n
his public and in his private capacity.45 Other courts have invoked the
authorities of the government which is, by the rules of international law, charged

with the security of diplomatic and consular premises and archiver of foreign govern-

ments."
41
But where the party before the court as claimant or as defendant is neither the
sovereign nor his ambassador, it is now the established rule that the claim will not be
allowed, unless by diplomatic intervention. Puente v. Spanish National State, 116 F.
(2d)
Inc.,
Sup.
(C.

43 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); also Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter J. Carpenter,

300 Fed. 891, 893, 32 F. (2d) 195 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), cert. de., 280 U. S.579, 50

Ct. 32 (1929); Oliver American Trading Co. v. Gov't of Mexico, 5 F. (2d) 659
C. A. 2d, 1924) cert. den., 267 U. S. 596, 45 Sup. Ct. 352 (1924).
42303 U. S.68, 58 Sup: Ct. 432 (1938).
43
Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div. 189, 20
N.44Y. S. (2d) 825 (1st Dep't 1940).
See Coale v. Societe CoSperative Suisse Des Charbons, Basle, 21 F. (2d) 180 (S.D.
N. Y. 1927), where immunity was denied a foreign government's publicly owned
corporation. For a grant of sovereign immunity, see Compania Mercantil Argentina v.
United States Shipping Board, 93 L. J. R. 816 (K. B. 1924).

(1939)
45

See RoBINSON,

ADMIRALTY

§ 34.

Fox, Competence of Courts in regard to the Non-Sovereign Acts of Foreign States

(1941) 35 AMi. J.INT. L. 632.
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doctrine of implied consent to the jurisdiction. 4 6 The federal courts have
declared that where a corporation is attempting to assert the claim, government ownership of all or a majority of the capital did not make the government the real party in interest.47 Thee and other criteria are highly
artificial and generally unworkable. There have been many attempts by
international jurists to specify the exceptions to the rule of sovereign immunity.48 These attempts culminated in the drafting of a Convention regarding the Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States by the Harvard
Research in International Law in 1932.49 In none of these articles has the
effect of war upon the sovereign defendant's right to immunity been discussed. 50 There is, however, a noticeable tendency to limit the confines of
the immunity even in times of peace.51
46

Competence of Courts in regard to Foreign States, 26 Am. J.

INT.

L. (Supp.) 451

(1932) ; ALLEN, THE PosITIoN OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COUarS (1933)
74

22.

Coale v. Societe Co~perative Suisse des Charbons, 21 F. (2d) 180 (S D. N. Y.
1927) ; United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F. (2d) 199 (S. D.
N. Y. 1929); Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F. (2d) 524 (Ct. of Customs.
& Pat. App. 1934). These cases would seem to indicate that, in the main case, mere
ownership of the defendant by Hungary would be insufficient to justify the plea.
4SROBINSON, ADMIRALTY (1939) 276; Hervey, The Immunity of Foreign States When
Engaged in Commercial Enterprises (1929) 27 MIcH. L. REv. 751; Fitzmaurice (1933)
14 BRIT. YR. BX. OF INT. L. 101; Fox, Competence of Courtsin Regard to Non-Sovereign
Acts of Foreign States (1941) 35 Am. J. INT. L. 632. See also: Dickinson, Waiver
of 'State Immunity (1925). 19 Am. J. INT. L. 555, 558; Report of the Committee of
E~xperts on Legal Status of Government Ships Employed in Commerce (1926) 20 Am.
J. NT. L. (Spec. Supp.) 260; Fairman, Some Disputed Applications of the Principle of
Sovereign Immunity (1928) 22 AM. J. INT. L. 5665.
The. latter author lists as shadow zones: (1) where state is suedfas owner of real
property; (2) inheritance; (3) where state has acted as a private person; (4) state
railroads;' (5) state merchant ships; (6) other state enterprises and monopolies;
(7) external state loans. See Report of the Committee of Experts of the League of
Nations (1928)'22 Am. J. INT. L, (Spec. Supp.) 117, for a substantial restatement of
the above, adding to the list, however, actions for a tort or quasi-tort committed in.
local territory.
49
See Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States (1932) 26 Am. J. INT. L.
(Supp.)
451.
50
OThe text of Article 3 of the Draft Convention, p. 455, reads: "A state may refuse to
permit another state to investigate or continue a proceeding in its courts if it does not
recognize that state, or if diplomatic relations are not maintained between the two
states." In the Comment on Article 3, the writers say: [Where the state of the forum
was at war with the state desiring to institute the proceeding] ". . . it seems clear that
no duty could be laid upon the state of the forum to permit the institution of the proceeding," It would not seem to be an illogical extension of the doctrine to abrogate in
time of war not only the lesser privilege of bringing suit but also the greater privilege
of freedom from suit.
51
See ALLEN, THE PosITION OF FOREIGN STATEs, BEFoRE NATIONAL COURTS (1933)
ch. II; also the language of Sir Robert Phillimore in the Charkieh, 4 Admr. and Ecc.
59 (1873), to the effect that the exemption does not apply to immovable property;
cf. Sharp's Rifle Mfg. Co. v. Rowan, 34 Conn. 329 (1867), where conveyance of real
prbperty, title to which stood in the' name of an agent of the British government,
could be compelled; see also Walton, State Immunity in the Laws of England, France,,
Italy, and Belgium (1920) 2 3. ComP. LEG. & INT. L. 252. The writer summarizes
the resolutions of the Institute of International Law at the meeting in Hamburg in
1891. At page 255 he says: [an action may be permitted against a foreign state when
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52
There can be no question that the United States is at war with Hungary.
It is now well established that war does not in and of itself work a confiscation of private enemy property within the local sovereign's territory;53
however, it is not so well established that this rule extends to the protection
of public enemy property.5 4 It would seem that the rul has been extended
to include public property when we consider the various local Trading with
the Enemy Acts. 55 The Trading with the Enemy Acts serve, as the titles
indicate, to prevent intercourse with the enemy, rather than to confiscate
enemy property. The acts substitute the Alien Property Custodian for the
enemy in the enjoyment of the privileges of ownership. 56 He is empowered
57
to seize any property in the United States owned by an enemy country.
The property once seized is subject to attachment for the payment of the
debts of the alien enemy. 58 The court, in the main case, concedes that the
plaintiff could have enforced his rights against the Alien Property Custodian, had the property been seized by the latter. 59 Undoubtedly, such
seizure would have been a revocation of the implied consent whereof the
defendant derives his sovereign immunity. However, in the present case
the consent had not been revoked by acts of seizure; therefore, the court
considered the immunity still claimable. This is, however, a debatable
point, for the immunity may have been revoked by our acts short of seizure.
Since immunity in a case such as this arises from the local sovereign's
consent, it would seem that the existence of a state of war between the
two sovereigns would operate impliedly to revoke that consent. Immunity
for acts performed in the exercise of external sovereignty would seem to be
the child of comity. If ndn-recognition operates to deny certain extra-

it is an]

"...

5. Action founded on contracts made in that country by express proviso,

or52becausq of the nature of the action."
See the Proclamations of a State of War Between the United States and Hungary,
FED. REG. 5535,
STAT. 307 (1942).
INTERNATIONAL LAw (5th ed.

Exec. Proc. 2563, July 17, 1942, 7

the Declaration of War, see 56

50 U. S. C. Appendix (1942).

For

1937) 270; 2 WHEATON, INTERNAed. 1929) 643; Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch 110; 3 L. Ed. 504
(1814) (held, the declaration of war did not authorize the confiscation of enemy
property. It vested only the right to confiscation, the assertion of which depended
upon the will of the sovereign).
542 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw (5th ed. 1937) 271.
532 OPPENHEIIM,
TIONAL LAw (6th

55
British Trading With the Enemy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 GEO. V. c. 87; Trading With the
Act of 1917, 50 U. S. C. Appendix (1940).
Enemy
6
S Pflueger v. United States, 121 F. (2d) 732 (App. D. C. 1941), cert. den., 314 U. S.
617, 62 Sup. Ct. 98 (1942). The dominant purpose is to give to citizens and their
friends an adequate remedy against the invasion of their rights in the exercise of war
powers by the government. See also Brown v. J. P. Morgan & Co., 177 Misc. 763, 31
N.57Y. S. (2d) 815 (1941), denying inot., 177 Misc. 626, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 323.
Exec. Order No. 9095, March 11, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 1971, establishing the office of
the Alien Property Custodian. See Dulles, The Vesting Powers of the Alien Property
(1943) 28 CORNELL L. Q. 245.
Custodian
58
The Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, § 9, 40 STAT. 415, 50 U. S. C. Appendix

§ 59
9 (1940).
Telkes v. Hungarian Nat'l Museum, 265 App. Div. 192, 197, 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 419,
424 (2d Dep't 1942).
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territorial privileges of the unrecognized sovereign, such as the right to maintain suit in the courts of the local sovereign,60 enmity should carry with it
the greater penalty of a denial of immunity from suit. In only one case that
the writer has been able to find has the claim to sovereign immunity been
granted by one belligerent to another.61 The decision, however, is not necessarily conclusive of the present case. In this, a German case, the Armistice
of 1918 was ten months old, hostilities had ceased, negotiations for peace
were pending, and Germany and the United States were only nominally
at war, althougl the war did not end legally until 1921.62
In Ex Parte Colonna63 an effect of war was a denial of the right of an
ambassador of an enemy sovereign to present the claim of sovereign immunity. It did not appear in that case that the property had been seized
by the Alien Property Custodian; yet, quite effectively, the property was
held subject to litigation, and immunity denied. In the present case, it
would seem that the presentation of the. claim by a representative of a
different sovereign could endow the enemy property with greater sanctity
than a presentation by the representative of the owner. It would not appear
to violate any established rule of International Law to hold that the existence
of a state of .war impliedly revokes the sovereign immunity of an enemy
sovereign for acts performed in the exercise of external sovereignty. The
burden would then be cast upon the Executive Department either to destroy
the implication by enunciating a policy or to confirm it by tacitly approving
tHe revocation. In this way, the orderly administration of justice in local
courts could go on as usual, and the rights of private litigants would not
be prejudiced unfairly by a possibly frivolous claim of immunity. In the present case, the plaintiff is a citizen of the United States employed by the
Hungarian National Museum whose salary is unpaid by his employer. By
the decision, he is deprived of ordinary processes for the collection of his
claim by the extension of favor to a government with which the'United States
is actually at war.
John E. Culinal. Jr.

6
ORussian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E.
259 (1923).
6
IThe Ice King, Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichtes in Zivilsachen, CIII (1922) 274.
The suit was for damages arising out of a collision with the Jonas Sell in Dutch
waters in Aug. 1919. The United States Shipping Board claimed sovereign immunity
and the Imperial Court affirmed a decision of the Oberlandesgericht granting the immunity and dismissing the claim for damages. However, the German court empha-sized that the doctrine might be different when the property involved was not a ship,
but an immovable within -the jurisdiction. The case was severely criticized by Dr.
Gothard Brandis in Hanseatische Gerichtsezeitung (1921) com. pt. 87; Rezne Internationale du Droit Maritine, XXXIII, (1922) (1) 871; for discussion, see ALLEN,
TnE
POsITioN OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATiONAL COURTS (1933) 87.
62
See Hudson, Thw Duration of the War Between the United States and Germany
(1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 1020, 1029.
63314 U. S. 510, 62 Sup. Ct. 373 (1942).
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Quasi-contract: Gifts: Effect of New York anti-heart balm statute.The plaintiff gave an engagement ring to his fiancee, the defendant. Subsequently the agreement to marry was abandoned by mutual consent. Plaintiff
brought this action to recover the ring. The defendant moved for judgment
on the pleadings under Civil Practice Rule 112 on the ground that the action
was barred by Section 61-b of the Civil Practice Act which abolishes "rights
of action heretofore existing to recover sums of money as damages for ...
breach of contract to marry." The motion was denied. The court held that
an action to recover jewelry given in connection with a contract of marriage,
subsequently rescinded by mutual consent, is not an action to recover damages
for breach of the contract, and hence is not within the statutory prohibition.
Unzger v. Hirsch, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 965 (NV. Y. City Ct. 1943).
Ordinarily, a gift completed by delivery is irrevocable.1 But gifts which
are intimately connected with a proposed marriage are an exception to this
rule. When the reason for the gift ceases to exist ,because the engagement2
has been cancelled, it would be unjust to allow the donee to retain it.
It has been generally held that an engagement ring belongs to this class of
gifts.3
Under some circumstances the courts regard gifts to a betrothed as absolute
and irrevocable. Recovery is denied where a gift was a Christmas present, 4
or where it was made before the engagement for the purpose of introducing
the donor to the donee or of stimulating the donee's affections. 5 Where recovery of a gift of this type is allowed, it is based on elements of fraud or
undue influence appearing in the transaction, not merely on the disappointed
expectations of the donor." Gifts made in contemplation of marriage, on
the other hand, may in a proper case be recovered without proof of such
additional facts.
In determining whether recovery of a gift made in contemplation of mar1
Kelso v. Kelso, 96 N. J. Eq. 354, 124 At. 763 (1924) ; Rosenberg v. Lewis, 210 App.
Div. 690, 206 N. Y. Supp. 353 (1st Dep't 1924) ; Williamson v. Johnson, 62 Vt. 378, 20
Ati. 279 (1890) ; BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) 84; 2 WILISTON, CONTRlcTs (rev.
ed., Williston & Thompson, 1936) § 439.
2
Recovery of gifts made in contemplation of marriage other than engagement rings
was allowed in Rockafellow v. Newcomb, 57 Ill. 186 (1870) ; Walker v. Hester, 178 Ky.
342, 198 S. W. 912 (1917); Lumsden v. 'Arbaugh, 207 Mo. App. 561, 227 S. W. 868
(1921); Antaramian v. Ourakian, 118 Misc. 558, 194 N. Y. Supp. 100 (App. Term, 1922);
Williamson v. Johnson, 62 Vt. 378, 20 Atl. 279 (1890); Burke v. Nutter, 79 W. Va.
743, 91 S. E. 812 (1917) ; Lambert v. Lambert, 66 W. Va. 520, 66 S. E. 689 (1909).
3
Sloin v. Lavine, 11 N. J. Misc. 899, 168 Atl. 849 (Sup. Ct. 1933) ; Hutchinson v.
Kernitzky, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 650 (App. Term, 1940); Wilson v. Riggs, 243 App. Div.
33, 276 N. Y. Supp, 232 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd without opinion 267 N. Y. 570, 196 N. E.
584 (1935) ; Beck v. Cohen, 237 App. Div. 729, 262 N. Y. Supp. 716 (1st Dep't 1933) ;
Benedict v. Flannery, 115 Misc. 627, 189 N. Y. Supp. 104 (App. Term, 1921) ; Ruehling
v. 4Hornung, 98 Pa. Super. 535 (1929).
Richmond v. Nye, 126 Mich. 602, 85 N. W. 1120 (1901); Ruehling v. Hornung,
98 Pa. Super. 535 (1929). See also Seiler v. Funk, 32 Ont. 99 (1914) ; Fortier v. Brault,
10 West. Week. Rep. 807, 808 (County Ct., Man. 1916).
GWalter v. Moore, 198 Ky. 744, 249 S. W. 1041 (1923) ; Robinson v. Cumming, 2 Atk.
409,
6 26 Eng. Repr. 646 (1742) ; RESTATEMENT, REsTTuTrON (1937) § 58, illustration 4.
See Notes (1939) 52 HAgv. L. REv. 529; (1924) 33 A. L. R. 590.
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riage should be granted, three situations are to be distinguished: (1) Where
the engagement was broken due to the fault of the donor, recovery is denied.7
(2) Where the engagement was broken by the donee without cause, recovery is permitted.8 (3) Where the engagement was terminated by mutual
consent, recovery is allowed.9 '
The authorities are generally agreed upon the result to be reached in a
case which falls within any of these three classes. However, there is no
unanimity as to the theory which should be employed to reach that result.
In the principal case, the court adopts the view that the abandonment of the
engakement was equivalent to the rescission of a contract by mutual assent.
After rescission, to prevent unjust enrichment, the parties should be restored
to the positions which they occupied before the contract was made, which
necessarily required the return of the ring.10
This theory may be criticised on the ground that in most cases it is highly
improbable that the ring or other gift was intended by the parties as consideration for the recipient's promise to marry. Although there are cases where
the transfer of valuable property is the actual inducement which leads the
transferee to assent to the marriage," a different interpretation is required
where 'the gift is an engagement ring. However, the rescission theory is not
7Schult v. Duitz, 253 Ky. 135, 69 S. W. (2d) 27 (1934); Beer v. Hart, 153 Misc.

277, 274 N. Y. Supp. 671 (Mun. Ct. 1934); Cohen v. Sellar [19261 1 K. B. 536. See also
Beck v. Cohen, 237 App. Div. 729, 733, 262 N. Y. Supp. 716, 721 (lst Dep't 1933).
Cf.8 Ruehling v. Hornung, 98 Pa. Super. 535 (1929) ; Seiler v. Funk, 32 Ont. 99 (1914).
Rockafellow v. Newcomb, 57 Ill. 186 (1870); Walker v. Hester, 178 Ky. 342, 198
S. W. 912 (1917); Lumsden v. Arbaugh, 207 Mo. App. 561, 227 S. W. 868 (1921);
Sloin v. Lavine, 11 N. J. Misc. 899, 168 Ati. 849 (Sup. Ct. 1933) ; Hutchinson v. Kernitzky, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 650 (App. Term, 1940); Antaramian v. Ourakian, 118 Misc.
558, 194 N. Y. Supp. 100 (App. Term, 1922); Benedict v. Flannery, 115 Misc. 627, 189
N. Y. Supp. 104 (App. Term, 1921); Williamson v. Johnson, 62 Vt. 378, 20 At.
297 (1890) ; Burke v. Nutter, 79 W. Va. 743, 91 S. E. 812 (1917) ; Lambert v. ILambert,

66 W. Va. 520, 66 S. E. 689 (1909). See also Urbanus v. Burns, 300 Ill. App. 207, 211,

20 N. E. (2d) 869, 870 (1939) ; Cohen v. Sellar [19261 1 K. B. 536, 547. Cf. Stromberg
v. Rubenstein, 19 Misc. 647, 44 N. Y. Supp. 405 (Sup. Ct. 1897); Yubas v. Witaskis,
95 Pa. Super. 296 (1928) (in both cases, recovery denied on ground of defendant's inx
.
fancy.)
9
Hutchinson v. Kernitzky, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 650 (App. Term, 1940); Wilson v.
Riggs, 243 App. Div. 33, 276 N. Y. Supp. 232 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd without ophion,
267 N. Y. 570, 196 N. E. 584 (1935). See also Cohen v. Sellar [19261 1 K. B. 536,
which also contains a dictum to the effect that recovery should be allowed if the marriage does not take place, either through the death of, or through a disability recognized
by law on the part of, the donor. Cf. Urbanus v. Burns, 300 Ill. App. 207, 20 N. E.
(2d) 869 (1939), noted (1939) 38 MicH. L. REv. 248 (projected marriage failed to occur
because of the death of the donee; recovery denied) ; Richmond v. Nye, 126 Mich. 602,
85 N. W. 1120 (1901) (engagement terminated by mutual consent; recovery denied).
Both cases are distinguishable on the ground that there was evidence tending to show
that the gifts were intended as Christmas presents.
'Other cases where the language used indicates that the court is thinking in terms
of contract law are: Schultz v. Duitz, 253 Ky. 135, 69 S. W. (2d) 27 (1934) ; Rockafellow v. Newcomb, 57 Ill. 186 (1870) ; Yubas v. Witaskis, 95 Pa. Super. 296 (1928);
Lambert v. Lambert, 66 W .Va. 520, 66 S. E. 689 (1909).
liWalker v. Hester, 178 Ky. 342, 198 S. W. 912 (1917); Lambert v. Lambert, 66
W. Va. 520, 66 S. E. 689 (1909).
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untenable as a basis for the recovery of the ring or its value. Although the'
performance for which restitution is sought 'in the typical rescission case is
a performance rendered under the contract as part of an agreed exchange,
restitution may also be given where the performance was rendered in reliance on2 the defendant's promise yet not in consideration of a bargain made
by him.'
Other cases *have adopted the view that the ring is a conditional gift.13
While there is authority for the proposition that a gift on condition precedent
is unknown to the law,14 the reasoning employed is inapplicable to the gift
on condition subsequent,15 for which adequate support can be found. 16
The courts adopting the conditional gift theory have not been realistic
about the nature of the condition with which they were dealing. It ought
to be obvious that an engagement ring will seldom be presented upon the
17
express condition that it is to be returned if the marriage fails to occur.
The condition implied in fact, like the express condition, is based upon the
manifested assent of the parties.1 8 In finding implied conditions, the courts
do not examine closely the conduct of the parties to discover the state of their
minds, but frequently indulge in the loose presumption that the gift was
intended to be upon condition. 19 In most cases, therefore, the condition is
actually constructive; it.is imposed by law. Some 'inconsistencies in the
decided cases can easily be explained on the basis that the courts have regarded the imposition of the condition as a discretionary20matter, to be denied
where it is not needed to do justice between the parties.
12
RESTAT-MENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 348, comment b.
13 Sloin v. Lavine, 11 N. J. Misc. 899, 168 Atl. 849 (Sup. Ct. 1933) ; Wilson v. Riggs,
243 App. Div. 33, 276 N. Y. Supp. 232 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd without opinion, 267 N. Y.

570, 196 N. E. 584 (1935) ; Ruehling v. Hornung, 98 Pa. Super. 535 (1929) ; Williamson
62 Vt. 378, 20 Atl. 279 (1890).
v. Johnson,
' 4Doty v. Wilson, 47 N. Y. 580 (1872) ; Irish v. Nutting, 47 Barb. 370 (N .Y. 1867);
Balliag v. Manhattan Say. Bank, 110 Tenn. 288, 75 S. W. 1051 (1903).
15Bowx, PESONAL PROPERTY (1936) § 49.
note 13.
16Supra
7

1 Beck v. Cohen, 237 App. Div. 729, 262 N. Y. Supp. 716 (Ist Dep't 1933) ; Cohen v.

Sellar [1926] 1 Y. B. 536; Jacobs v. Davis [1917] 2 K. B. 532. But see Yubas v. Witas-

kis, 95 Pa. Super. 296 (1928), where the chancellor found that the ring "was given
to the defendant upon the express condition, assented to by her, that if she broke the
engagement she should and would return it to the plaintiff."
183 WILLIs ON,, CONTRACTS (rev. ed., Williston & Thompson, 1936) § 668.
19See Sloin v. Lavine, 11 N. J. Misc. 899, 168 Atl. 849 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Wilson v.
Riggs, 243 App. Div. 33, 276 N. Y. Supp. 232 (1st Dep't 1934), af'd without opinion,
267 N. Y. 570, 196 N. E. 584 (1935); Beck v. Cohen, 237 App. Div. 729, 262 N. Y.
Supp. 716 (1st Dep't 1933) ; Fortier v. Brault, 10 West. Week. Rep. 807 (County Ct.,
1916).
Man.
20
See Note (1939) 38 MIcH. L. REv. 248. Where the action is brought to recover an
engagement ring, for example, the courts have been more willing to impose the condition than in cases where other gifts were involved. In Rosenberg v. Lewis, 210 App.

Div. 690, 206 N. Y. Supp. 353 (1st Dep't 1924) recovery of certain articles of jewelry
given to the defendant in anticipation of marriage was denied. The court found no
express or implied condition and refused to impose a constructive condition. The
Rosenberg case was distinguished in Beck v. Cohen, 237 App. Div. 729, 731, 262 N. Y.
Supp. 716, 718 (1st Dep't 1933), the court pointing out that in the Rosenberg case "the
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In the last analysis,, recovery o an engagement ring or other property
transferred in contemplation of marriage rests upon a quasi-contractual
basis, 21 even though the court chooses to rationalize its holding in terms of
conditional gift or of rescission of the contract to marry.22 Restitution is
granted where it is necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the transferee; it is denied where equitable considerations do not require a return of
the property to the transferor, i.e., where the engagment was broken by his
own fault.
In the principal case the court concluded that the donor's right to recover
the ring upon the termination of the engagement by the mutual assent of the
parties was not barred by Article 2-A of the Civil Practice Act.23 In Andie v.
Kaplan2 4 the complaint stated a cause of action to recover money and jewelry
delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant in connection with mutual promises
of marriage between the parties. The court dismissed the complaint because
it was within the prohibition of Sections 61-a, 61-b and 61-d of the C. P. A.
The decision in the principal case distinguishes Andie v. Kaplan on the ground
that there the agreement to marry was not abandoned by mutual consent but
was repudiated by the defendant. The law of New York, as declared in
Andie v. Kaplan and Unger v. Hirsch, seems to be that a donee must return
a gift made in contemplation of marriage if the agreement was terminated by
mutual consent, but may keep the gift if the marriage agreement was broken
property involved was not an engagement ring." This distinction has been ignored and
the condition has been imposed in other cases concerning property other than rings.
Zawadzki v. Vandetti, 255 App. Div. 932, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 219 (4th Dep't 1938) ; Cushing v. Hughes, 119 Misc. 39, 195 N. Y. Supp. 200 (Sup. Ct. 1922) ; Antaramian v. Ourakian,
118 Misc. 558, 194 N. Y. Supp. 100 (App. Term, 1922).
21
Zawadzki v. Vandetti, 255 App. Div. 932, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 219 (4th Dep't 1938) is
the only case in which the existence of a valid cause of action based upon quasi-contract
has been expressly recognized. But there are other cases from which the conclusion
is inescapable that the court is resting its decision upon an obligation imposed by law.
Thtis, in Williamson v. Johnson, 62 Vt. 378, 381, 20 Atl. 279, 280 (1890), it is stated
that "the court below found the facts that the plaintiff let the defendant Caroline have
both sums of money without any expectation that they would be refunded"; nevertheless, the holding of the case is that the gifts were not absolute but conditional, and
recovery was granted upon that basis. See also Antaramian v. Ourakian, 118 Misc.
558, 194 N. Y. Supp. 100 (App. Term, 1922), and note 19 supra.
225 WiLLISTOx, CONTRACTS (rev. ed., Williston & Thompson, 1936) § 1454.
23
The principal case is supported by Zawadzki v. Vandetti, 255 App. Div. 932, 9
N. Y. S. (2d) 219 (4th Dep't 1938) and Hutchinson v. Kernitzky, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 650
(App. Term, 1940). The Zawadski case was an action brought to declare void a bill
of sale of an automobile and to recover money claimed to have been given to defendant
in reliance on an alleged promise to marry. -The court recognized in the complaint a
valid cause of action based upon quasi-contract, with only one justice voting to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that the action was barred by C. P. A. Art. 2-A. The
abbreviated statement of facts in the Zawadzki case does not reveal which party was at
fault in terminating the engagement.
In the Hntchinvon case recovery of an engagement ring was allowed where it appeared
"without dispute that the engagement was either cancelled by mutual consent or was
broken by the defendant." Article 2-A of the C. P. A. was not mentioned.
24263 App. Div. 884, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 429 (2d Dep't 1942), aff'd without ophiion,
288 N. Y. 685, 43 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942).
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solely because of the donee's fault. This rule appears undesirable. It is not only
contrary to the general common-law rule,25 but it clearly enriches the wrongdoer unjustly.
Furthermore, it is a result which is not required by the statute. Section
61-b of the C. P. A. provides that "the rights of action heretofore existing to
recover sums of money, as damage for .

.

. breach of contract to marry are

hereby abolished." Section 61-d provides that "no contract to marry, hereafter made or entered into in this state shall operate to give rise, either
within or without this state, to any cause or right of action for the breach
thereof." 6 An action to recover an engagement ring or other gift made in
contemplation of marriage is not an action for the breach of a contract of
marriage. The action is quasi-contractual in nature. It is not based upon the
contract, but upon an obligation imposed by law to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant. 'The damages for the breach of a contract to marry
would normally be measured, not by the value of the engagement ring, but
by the value of the promised advantage of which the plaintiff has been
deprived by reason of defendant's breach 2 7 Clearly these are the damages
which are within the condemnation of- the statute.
That the cause of action for the return of a gift made in contemplation
of marriage does not arise from the breach of contract is made even dearer
by reference to cases like Grossman v. Greenstein.28 There the gift was made
by the father of the donee's fiancee. The marriage having failed to occur, the
donor was allowed to recover the gift. Obviously, recovery upon a breach
of contract theory is impossible in this situation, since the donor is a stranger
to the marriage agreement; but he is nevertheless entitled to a return of his
gift, since the donee, if allowed to retain it, would be unjustly enriched. Why
should a different theory prevail where the donor is a party to the marriage
agreement?
It seems clear that the legislative purpose in enacting Article 2-A of the
C. P. A. did not extend to the abolition of the right of action for recovery
of gifts made in contemplation of marriage. The intent of the legislature, as
expressed in Section 61-a of the C. P. A., was to do away with the "heartbalm" action, which had come into disrepute as-a "remedy ... exercised by
unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment." 9 The action to recover
a gift made in contemplation of marriage does not fall within this description.
Where recovery is allowed, the action does not result in the unjust enrich-'
ment of the plaintiff-donor, but prevents the unjust enrichment of the defendant-donee.3 0
25
Supra note 8.
26
1talics added.
275 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed., Williston & Thompson, 1936) § 1338.
28161 Md. 71, 155 At. 190 (1931).

29For a review of the abuses which led to the enactment of legislation of this type, see
Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm" (1935) 33 Mlcr. L. REv. 979.
30
The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, interpreting a statute substantially
identical with C. P. A. §§ 61-b and 61-d [N. J. Rmv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, §§ 39 A-i,
39 A-4], 'has held that an action, brought after defendant's alleged breach of promise
to marry plaintiff, to recover a sum of money as compensation for services rendered to
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The instant case appears correctly decided. However, so long as the decision of the Court of Appeals in Andie v. Kaplan is followed, New York will
deny a just recovery in a situation where it is generally granted by the law
of other jurisdictions.
Robert William Gribben

Taxation: Charitable deductions: Tax-saving techniques in drawing
testamentary trusts for both a private and a charitable use. - Congress
has endeavored to encourage posthumous philanthropy by reducing the tax
burden on estates which are devoted to religious, charitable, scientific, literary
or educational purposes. Often the testator will wish to set up a trust to
carry out his philanthropic purposes, but will wish to dilute his charity to the
extent of conferring the usu'fr.uct of the trust upon a private person for a limited period. In this situation and in others, the attorney must mold the trust
with care if the benefits of tax deductions are not to be discarded.
In the case of the estate tax, the test of deductibility is whether the devise
or bequest to the charity has a "presently ascertainable" value at the time
of death.' In the case of the tax on the income of a trust, the test is whether
the income has been paid to or "permanently set aside" for the charitable
use pursuant to the terms of the deed or will.2 While the phraseology of the

two tests is different, the technique in applying them is similar, and considerations governing the allowance of deductions in the one case are usually pertinent in determining the allowance of deductions in the other.3 Thus if a
trust is set up by will whereby the income is to be paid to a non-exempt
person or organization for life or for a term of years with the corpus to be
paid to an exempt organization (such as a charity) upon the termination of
the private interest, the value of the remainder interest is "presently ascertainable" and deductible from the gross estate. 4 If capital gains or any other part
of the gross income are allocable to corpus so that they are "permanently
set aside" for the exempt use, they will be deductible from the gross income. 5
But suppose that the will instead of simply granting the income to the
private beneficiary allows invasion of the corpus in which the exempt remainderman has an interest. Treasury Regulation 105, Section 81.44 provides:
defendant over a period of more than three years, during which time plaintiff refrained
from collecting the salary due her because of her expectation that the defendant would
marry her, is not barred by the statute. Glazer v. Klughaupt, 116 N. J. L. 507, 185
Atl. 8 (1936).
IINT. REv. CODE §
2INT. REV. CODE: §

812 (d) (1939) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105 § 81.44.
162 (a) (1939) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.162-1.
Merchants National Bank of Boston v. Commissioner, 132 F. (2d) 483, 485 (C' C. A.
1st, 1942), aff'd, 320 U. S.256, 64 Sup. Ct. 108 (1943) ; Commissioner v. F. G. Bonfils
Trust Co. et al., 115 F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 10th, 1943); Note (1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 754.,
4U. S. Treas. Reg. 105 § 81.44.
5Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151, 49 Sup. Ct. 291 (1929) (by implicati6n).
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"If a trust is created for both a charitable and a private purpose,
deduction may be taken of the value of the beneficial interest in favor
of the former only in so far as such interest is presently ascertainable,
and hence severable from the interest in favor of the private use."
Section 81.46 statFs that
"if the . . . trustee is empowered to divert the property or fund, in

whole or in part, to a use or purpose which would have rendered it, to the
extent that is subject to such power, not deductible had it been directly
so bequeathed, ... deductiofi will be limited to that portion, if any, of
the property or fund, which is exempt from an exercise of such power."
Since in the hypothetical case the corpus may be diverted to the private use,
it would seem from a literal reading of these secti6ns that the entire corpus
woul-d-be subject to the estate tax. Such is not invariably the result.
Generally, deductions will be allowed if it can be shown with reasonable
certainty by mathematical calculation that the fact situation which would
justify the exercise of a power to invade the corpus will never arise.> Deduction will be allowed where the trust instrument provides for fixed annuities to be paid' to private beneficiaries and to be a charge first against income
and then against corpus if it is apparent that the'income of the trust will be
adequate to pay the annuities. 7 If an invasion of the corpus for payment of
the annuity is not improbable, a deduction ordinarily will not be allowed.8
In the leading case of Ithaca Trust Co. v.United.States,9 the trustees were
authorized to invade the corpus in which certain charities had remainder
interests for the purpose of maintaining the widow "in as much comfort as
she now enjoys." It was shown that the widow's separate income plus the
income from the trust was ample to maintain her according to her custom.
Mr. Justice Holmes construed the trust agreement to mean that invasion was
permissible only to maintain the widow in her "station in life." The cost of
such maintenance would be estimated by reference to expenditures in previous years. Since invasion for the purpose of supporting the widow was not
probable, the present value of the charitable remainder interests'0 was deductible in computing the gross estate and capital gains allocable to corpus
fact and
were deductible from the gross income. "The standard was fixed ift
capable of being stated in definite terms of money. .

.

.There was no un-

Olbid.
7
Commissioner v. Bank of America Nat. Trust and Savings Ass'n, 133 F. (2d) 753
(C. C. A. 9th, 1943) ; Commissioner v. F. G. Bonfils Trust Co. et at., 115 F. (2d) 788
(C. C. A. 10th, 1940).
8Od Colony Trust Co., 33 B. T. A. 311 (n. a. 1935), mod. on other grounds, 87 F.
(2d) 131 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 301 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 813
(1937); Lewis Baer, T. C. Memo, 1943 Prentice-Hall Fed. Tax. Serv. ff 64577.
9279 U. S. 151, 49 Sup. Ct. 291 (1929).
'ld.at 155, 49 Sup. Ct. at 292: "But the value of property at a given time depends
upon the relative intensity of the social desire for it at that time, expressed in the
money that it would bring in the market," [citing International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 215, 34 Sup. Ct. 853 (1914)]
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certainty greater than that which attends all human affairs."ii
The lower courts have applied the "station in life" test with liberality.
Powers to invade for the "comfortable
maintenance and support,"' 2 for
"comfort, maintenance, and support,"' 3 or for "proper support and comfort,"1 4 were construed to allow invasion only for the purpose of maintaining the private beneficiary according to his "station in life." Since the income
in each of these cases was more than adequate for the purpoge, impairment of
the interest of the charity was improbable and deductions were allowed.
Ordinarily, if impairment is not improbable deductions will be disallowed. 1
The burden is on the tax-payer to show the amount of the deduction to
which he is entitled. 16 The life expectancy of the private beneficiary, the
amount of his sparate income, the amount of the income from the trust
property, the expenditures of the private beneficiary in previous years may
variously be resorted to in sustaining the burden. 17 If the present value of
the remainder is not ascertainable by computations based on legally acceptable
data (such as actuarial tables), the courts will refuse to make a guess even
though it is certain that the remainder interest will not be wholly defeated.18
For example, suppose that the will creates a trust of $300,000, income for
life to a private person, remainder to a charity, except that on the death of
the private beneficiary the trustee shall pay $5,000 tb each of the living
daughters of the testator's two nephews and two nieces. The court could
be quite certain that not all of the fund would be diverted from the charitable
use, but since there is no way of determining the value of the charitable
interest save by guessing, no deduction will be allowed.' 9
As another illustration, suppose that the trustee is given the authority to
credit any receipts, or charge any disbursements, to either capital or income
at his discr tion. No deduction will be allowed because such a provision
obliterates 'the dividing line between corpus
and income, thus making the
20
remainderman's interest unascertainable.
Likewise, where the right to invade depends solely on subjective considerations, deduction will not be allowed because unmeasurable factors are involved. In Gcintons et al. v. Hassett, Collector,2 ' where excursions into the
*

11id.
at 165, 49 Sup. Ct. at 291 (1929).
12 Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Eaton, Collector, 36 F. (2d) 710 (C. C. A.
2d, 3 1929).
14 Lucas, Commissioner v. Mercantile Trust Co., 43 F. (2d) 39 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).
1 First National Bank of Birmingham v. Snead, Collector, 24 F. (2d) 186 (C. C. A.
5th, 1928).
15Helvering v. Union Trust Co., 125 F. (2d) 401 (C. C. A. -, 1942), cert. den., 316
U. 6S. 696, 62 Sup. Ct. 1292 (1942).
1 Burnet v. Houston, 283 U. S. 223, 51 Sup. Ct. 413 (1931) ; Bank of America Trust
& Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 126 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942); Pennsylvania
Co. for Insurances on Lives, 6 F. Supp. 582 (E. D. Pa. 1933), aff'd per curian, 70 F.

(2d) 269 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1934).

'17thaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151, 49 Sup. Ct. 291 (1929).
lSPennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives v. Commissioner, 6 F. Supp. 582 (E. D.
Pa.9 1933). Cf. Herbert A. Wilder, 20 B. T. A. 1159 (n. a. 1930).
' Pennsylvania Co. v. Commissioner, 6 F. Supp. 582 (E. D. Pa. 1933).
2
oColt et aL. v. Duggan et al., 25 F. Supp. 268 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
21121 F. (2d) 229 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941).
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corpus were to be allowed according to the "need or desire" of the widow,
no deduction was allowed although the widow was 93 years old, had been
bed-ridden for years, was of frugal habits and was receiving an ample income
from her private estate and from the income of the trust. "When the testator gave his wife the power to invade the principal as she 'may *** desire,'
he meant what he said. He intended to giv her a broad power of invasion
of the principal, not restricted
to a mere use of the corpus for the purpose
22
of satisfying her needs."
But where the will provided'that the trustee should invade the corpus for the
benefit of the widow upon receiving the widow's written statement that she required the money for her "comfort, maintenance ,and support," a deduction
seemingly was improperly allowed.23 The court thought that this provision
did not amount to an unrestricted power to invade. "If a trustee, upon a
mere written notice of the widow that she needed the entire corpus of the
estate for her comfort, maintenance, and support, should turn over the same
to her, it would, in our judgment, be guilty of a dereliction of duty. ' 24 The
court thought that invasion would be permissible only to maintain the widow
according to her "station in life." If the interpretation of the provision is
correct, the result is not open to question, but it would seem that the intention of the testator was to leave the wife and the trustee free from molestation by the charitable remaindermen and, in particular, to relieve the trustee
from liability for excursions 25
into the corpus which would be unjustified under

the "station in life" doctrine.

The doctrine of the Gammons case was recently approved in Merchants
National Bank of Boston v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 256, 64 Sup. Ct. 108
(1943). The trustee was empowered to invade the corpus'at his sole discretion for the "comfort, suppport, maintenance and/or happiness"26 of the
testator's widow, his discretion to be exercised with liberality to the widow
so as to prefer her comfort and happiness to the claims of charitable remaindermen. No deductions were allowed in computing gross estate for estate
tax purposes, nor were capital gdins deductible in computing the estate's
income tax. Said Mr. Justice Rutledge:
"Only where the conditions on which the extent of invasion of the
corpus depends are fixed by reference to some readily ascertainable and
reliably predictable facts do the amount which will be diverted from the
charity and the present value of- the bequest become adequately meas",27
urable ....
22
d. at 232.
23

Lucas, Commissioner v. Mercantile Trust Co., 43 F. (2d) 39 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).

241d.

at 43.

25Cf. Colt et al. y. Duggan et al., 25 F. Supp. 268, 272 (S. D. N. Y. 1938) ; 6 BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, (1935) 3610, Form No. 4:
"The Trustee shall pay the net income from the trust fund to the wife of the Settlor
as long as she shall live. In addition thereto, the Trustee shall pay to her such sum
or sums from the principal of the trust fund as she shall from time to time in writing
direct
during her lifetime."
.2276Italics added.
Merchants National Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 256, 261, 64 Sup. Ct. 108,
111 (1943).
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"Under this will the extent to which the principal might be used was
not restricted by a fixed standard based on the widow's prior way of
life.... Introducing the element of the widow's happiness and instructing the trustee to exercise his discretion with liberality to make her
wishes prior to the claims of residuary beneficiaries brought into the
calculation elements of speculation too large to be overcome, notwithstanding the widow's previous mode of life was modest and her own
resources substantial....
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. JuStice Jackson dissented 29 on the strength
of the Ithaca Trust Co. case,30 arguing that whether the gift was "presently
ascertainable" *or the capital
gains "permanently set aside" were questions
31
for the trier of the facts.
In drawing testamentary trusts wherein the interests are to be divided between private and charitable beneficiaries, the testator's desire to create a
flexible mechanism which will be responsive to the needs or wishes of the
private beneficiary must be balanced against the heavier tax burden which
such flexibility is apt to entail. To summarize, deductions will probably be
denied 32 (1) where invasion is permitted at the desire

or for the happi-

ness3 4 of the private beneficiary, whatever the size of the estate or its probable income; (2) where annuities to private beneficiaries are made a charge
first against income and then against corpus and it is not clear that resort to
the corpus will be unnecessary;85 (3) where invasion for proper support and
maintenance is allowed and it is not clear that the income will be adequate for
such support of the private beneficiary;36 (4) where the trustee is authorized to determine whether property received by him shall be treated as income
or capital and whether payments or disbursements should be made from income or capital,37 (5) where the charitable bequest is conditioned upon the
happening or non-happening bf some event and it is not improbable that the
gift will'thereby be defeated.38
28d. at 262, 64 Sup. Ct. at 112 (1943).
29320
U. S. 256, 263, 64 Sup. Ct. 108, 112 (1943).
30
See text at note 9 supra..
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Helvering, 316 U. S. 164, 168, 63 Sup. Ct. 984, 986
(1942): "It is the function of the Board, not the Circuit Court of Appeals, to weigh
the evidence, to draw inferences from the facts, and to choose between conflicting inferences."
I
3 This enumeration is not intended to be exhaustive.
33Gammons
et al. v. Hassett, Collector, 121 F. Z2d) 229 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941)'.
34
Merchants National Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U. S.156, 64 Sup. Ct. 108 (1943).
35
See note 8 supra.
31

36
3 See

note 15 supra.

7See
note 20 spra.
8
3 1t is not the purpose of this note to deal generally with the problem of contingent
charitable gifts. The general rule is stated in MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES ON ESTATES,
TRuSTS,

AND

GIFTs (1943)

541: "Where divestiture of a charitable bequest is subject

to the hajpening of future events, the test of whether deduction is allowable is the
degree of likelihood that the convlitions imposed will prevent the ultimate possession and
enjoyment of the gift. Thus, a bequest, after the death of the life tenant of a testamentary trust, to charity conditioned on the continued existence and operation of the
charity within a specified locality is deductible. [E. T. 13, C. B. 1939-2, 326]". In Wood
v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 197 (W. D. Ark. 19&7), the testator created a trust for
a nephew seventeen years old, the nephew to receive the income until his twenty-ninth
birthday at which time he was to receivd the corpus; but if he should die before receiving
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A power to invade for the private use will not prevent the' allowance of
deductions if, in all probability, the power will never be exercised.3 9 Does
it necessarily follow that no deduction on account of the charitable gift
may be secured where the power of invasion is likely to be exercised?w It
has been stated that: "In cases where there was some degree of likelihood
that part of the fund would be invaded, but none that the balance would be
used, the courts have held that the whole is non-deductible." 41 This statement
is too broad, for in the cases cited to support it2 the part of the fund which
would be diverted, and hence the balance which would remain, could be fixed
only by an arbitrary guess. These cases stand merely for the proposition
that the tax-payer must sustain the burden of proving not only that he is
entitled to a deduction, but the amount which he is entitled to deduct. Where
it is clear from the terms of the trust instrument that an ascertainable minimum amount will pass to the charity, a deduction of that amount should not
be denied simply on the ground that the charity may receive a larger amount.
In order to enable the tax-payer to prove the minimum amount, one of the
following provisions might be placed in the trust instrument: (1) that the
corpus shall not be reduced, through the exercise of the power of invasion,
below a certain figure; (2) that invasion shall be lifnited to a certain sum
in toto or to a certain percentage of the fund; or (3) that invasion be limited to a certain sum or percentage in each year where it appears that when
the value of the private interest in the corpus is deducted, an ascertainable
sum will remain to the charity. 43 Under these provisions, determination of

the amount of the deduction would not be arbitrary. It would be ascertained by reference to the terms of the trust instrument.
Edward M. S-wallwood
the corpus, it was to go to a public school. No deduction was allowed. See also U. S.
Treas.
Reg. 105 § 81.46.
3
409See

notes 7, 12, 13, and 14 supra.

1ncome being accumulated to be paid over to charity some time in the future ordi-

narily will be "permanently set aside" and- deductible from gross income. S. M. 4613,
V-1 Cum. BuLL. 71 (1926). A problem similar to the one referred to in the text arises
where a part of the income is to be used for a private purpose and part accumulated
for the charitable use. The value of the charitable interest must be ascertainable if a
deduction is to be allowed, and a deduction has been allowed where the value of the
charitable interest could be ascertaiped by applying the "station in life" doctrine to
limit the private interest. Herron et df. v. Heiner, Collector, 24 F. (2d) 756 (W. D. Pa.
1927). Deduction will be allowed where charges for non-exempt uses are against
current income alone, since in such a case the accumulated income is not subject to
diversion to the private use. Commissioner v. Upjohn, 124 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 6th,
1941).
41
Note (1941) 41 COL. L. Ray. 754, 756.
42
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 30 B. T. A. 679 (1934) ; Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives v. Brown, 6 F. Supp. 582 (E. D. Pa. 1933), aff'd
per
curiam, 70 F. (2d) 269 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
43
Where the trustee was empowered to invade the corpus up to 10% annually for
the welfare of the private beneficiary, deductions were allowed to the extent of the
charitable remainder reduced by 10% for each year of life expectancy of the beneficiary.
Ben F. Sternheim, T. C. Memo., June 24, 1943, f944 Prentice-Hall Fed. Tax Serv.
ff 23,414. This case illustrates the use of the third provision suggested in the text. No
cases have been found in which the first two types of provisions have been used, but
since the third has been successfully utilized to obtain a deduction, it follows a fortiori
that the first two would also have that effect.

